Two November 2026 essays on Lawfare take up a problem that has resisted years of federal effort: the overlapping rules that require companies to report cyber incidents to multiple regulators. On November 12, Jason Healey of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs argued that harmonization will fail until governments state why they need each report. Two days earlier, Healey and Benjamin Pearl argued that artificial intelligence can absorb much of the compliance burden that disharmony creates.
A Framework Built on Purpose
Healey cites a 2023 Department of Homeland Security report counting 13 federal incident-reporting forms and 10 websites. According to that report, only three of the 22 agencies with reporting requirements accept another agency's form. State breach laws and foreign regimes such as the EU's NIS2 directive come on top of that.
His central claim is that deadlines and data fields should follow from the decision a report is meant to inform. A disruption like the Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident calls for information within minutes or hours. The Securities and Exchange Commission's rule, which he describes as requiring public companies to disclose material impacts within four days, serves a different purpose: informing investors.
The framework sorts information needs into three categories: government knowledge of incidents, government knowledge of threats and vulnerabilities, and the knowledge of third parties such as investors, sector peers, and supply chains. It assigns timelines in three tiers:
- Immediate (minutes to hours): early warnings and alerts about significant incidents.
- Important (days to weeks): investor disclosure and new vulnerabilities.
- Routine (weeks to months): trends and statistics.
Healey concludes that rules serving different purposes need not be tightly harmonized. Rules serving the same need, he says, should carry nearly identical timelines and requirements.
Applying It to CIRCIA
Healey applies the framework to the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA), enacted in 2022. He writes that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is close to finalizing the reporting rules. He adds that the six purposes listed in the proposed rule, which range from early warning to trend analysis and research, complicate the task. Because noncompliance can bring civil subpoenas and fines, he argues, each deadline should match the urgency of its purpose.
He also asks whether the government should compel reports for trend analysis or vulnerability mitigation at all, since mature organizations can buy that information from reputable vendors. And he identifies a gap: CIRCIA could have supported surge reporting during a geopolitical crisis such as a Chinese blockade of Taiwan.
The "Harmonization Tax"
Healey and Pearl define the "harmonization tax" as the time and money security staff spend translating the same incident data between regulatory regimes rather than defending systems. They attribute the tax to the "DC-MOB": rules that are duplicative, conflicting, misaligned, overly detailed, or burdensome. They cite a July Government Accountability Office (GAO) report finding that seven of 10 federal cybersecurity regulations duplicate another regulation's reporting requirements. According to the same report, a financial institution may face as many as 15 incident-reporting rules.
In the authors' view, AI-driven compliance tools can handle four of the five problems without new legislation. Conflicts are the exception. Citing a recent GAO report, they describe a firm that might face an SEC disclosure duty while suspicious-activity-report or confidentiality rules require silence. Only policy, legal, or legislative fixes can resolve such conflicts. The authors also acknowledge two risks: AI tools could be costly for smaller firms, and inaccurate AI output could cause legal trouble.
Their recommendations:
- The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) should ensure that new rules are AI-friendly.
- Regulators should publish rules in machine-readable formats.
- Regulators should consider requiring audit trails for AI compliance tools, so firms can verify how a system reached a determination.
- Regulators should justify any ban on using AI for a compliance task.
They also note that the Streamlining Federal Cybersecurity Regulations Act, introduced by Senators James Lankford and Gary Peters, would create an interagency Harmonization Committee at ONCD.
Legal and Policy Stakes
The essays diverge on strategy. One asks regulators to rebuild reporting mandates around stated purposes. The other advises against spending political capital on duplication that AI can manage. Both leave to policymakers the problems technology cannot fix: mandates that serve no clear purpose in one essay, and rules in outright conflict in the other. Healey's December 2024 essay with Samuel Dab named agencies' unique authorities and public policy purposes as one of eight drivers of disharmony. That essay contrasted CIRCIA's 72-hour deadline, which applies even to non-urgent purposes, with the SEC's choice to keep the four-day timeline it already used for material events. As CISA works to finalize the CIRCIA rule, the framework gives regulators a test of whether a reporting obligation fits the decision it is meant to support.
Sources
- Why Report Cyber Incidents Anyway? — lawfaremedia.org/article/why-report-cyber-incidents-anyway
- AI Can (Mostly) Solve Cyber Regulatory Harmonization and Efficiency — lawfaremedia.org/article/ai-can-(mostly)-solve-cyber-regulatory-harmonization-and-efficiency
- Drivers of Disharmony in U.S. Cyber Regulations — lawfaremedia.org/article/drivers-of-disharmony-in-u.s.-cyber-regulations