A series of damaged submarine cables over the past year has drawn new attention to the thin legal protections around the physical backbone of the internet — and to how hard it is to distinguish accident from deliberate act.
An Atlantic Council analysis observed that undersea cables sit awkwardly across regimes: the law of the sea, telecommunications treaties, and the law of armed conflict each touch them, yet none squarely governs peacetime sabotage by a state that never admits responsibility. Attribution at the seabed is even harder than in networks, and the response options are correspondingly murkier.
The underlying question — when a hostile act against civilian infrastructure crosses into the use of force — is one JLCW authors have examined head-on. "Silicon Trenches: Use of Force in the Cyber Age" (Volume 9, Issue 2) works through the jus ad bellum thresholds, while "From Munitions to Malware: A Comparative Analysis of Civilian Targetability in Cyber Conflict" (Volume 7, Issue 2) addresses the targeting of civilian systems.
For the full analysis, read the Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare, Volume 9, Issue 2. – JLCW Staff Writers